Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: If local public goods exhibit spillovers and regions are sufficiently symmetric, decentralization implies underprovision, whereas cooperative centralization is associated with strict Pareto-improvement. This classic inference rests on two assumptions: local politicians are delegated sincerely and never provide voluntary transfers to the other regions. We abandon these assumptions in a setup of two symmetric regions with imperfect complementarity between local public goods. For this particular aggregation, non-cooperative decentralization can achieve the social optimum, whereas cooperative centralization cannot.
Introduction
Recent explosion of political economy sheds new light on the classic tradeoffs in public economics, such as the one between benefits and costs of decentralization. In the first generation of fiscal federalism, decentralization was perceived only as a safeguard against uniform (one-size-fits-all) policies for asymmetric regions. In the second generation of fiscal federalism (Oates, 2005) , decentralization wins endorsement especially by political economists. Among others, Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 325-39) argue that cooperative centralization may exacerbate the effects of domestic incentive constraints, for example in the case of dynamic inconsistency in capital taxation. Wilson and Janeba (2003) show that decentralization allows for a more optimal mix of vertical and horizontal externalities under tax competition; Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) point to the higher accountability of the governments. Particularly in the European Union, trade-offs associated with centralization are increasingly more studied since the current assignment of tasks in multilevel EU-governance is contested both in theory and policy (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 2005) . We aim to contribute to this literature by a theoretical analysis of the case of imperfect complementarity. This particular aggregation occurs when one local good is complementary with another local good, but only imperfectly. For illustration of this aggregation, consider a stylized example of two terrorist groups, e.g. ETA and IRA. Suppose IRA is interested only in attacks in the U.K., and ETA in attacks in Spain; we call IRA 'domestic terrorists' in the U.K. and 'foreign terrorists' in Spain, and vice versa. Let both terrorist groups be perfectly mobile across the two countries, and assume that they can organize their activities from any country, if necessary. The countries spend 1 g , respectively 2 g , on non-rival domestic antiterrorist Although complementary or Leontief-type aggregation may be regarded as too extreme (Cornes, 1993) , it has rationale for situations when regions eliminate adversaries, or if the output depends on the least amount of inputs due to certain physical characteristics. In the former case, for example, rational terrorists tend to attack the least protected airline (Heal and Kuhnreuther, 2005) ; in the latter case, the level of protection against flood hinges on the level of the lowest dike (Hirshleifer, 1983) . Extensive discussion on applicability of imperfect complementarity (specifically on the source of the imperfection) follows in Section 5.
We apply imperfect complementarity on the strategic situation of two regions, each producing one local input. The local inputs are complements into the production of local outputs; the domestic input enters perfectly and the foreign input enters imperfectly. We adjust the seminal setup by Besley and Coate (2003) , by two modifications, complementary aggregation (instead of substitutes) and voluntary transfers. This allows comparison with their main result: in Besley and Coate (2003) , cooperative centralization produces a higher level of public good surplus if spillovers exceed a critical level. For our particular aggregation, this tradeoff is different; cooperative centralization never attains the social optimum, whereas noncooperative decentralization does, in some specifications even for all levels of spillovers.
We assume a two-stage game of voters grouped in two regions and two delegates, one per region. In Stage 1, voters in each region simultaneously elect their policy-seeking delegate. In Stage 2, the delegates simultaneously decide on the production of local inputs. We will specifically focus on the willingness to cover costs of the production of the local input in the other region (voluntary transfers). In the electoral game of voters, we will further examine incentives to strategic elect or delegate; we will concentrate on whether voting for a less interested representative will extract voluntary transfers from a relatively more interested representative from the other region. For this purpose we disregard any exogenously given heterogeneity by considering fully symmetric regions.
Strategic delegation is a phenomenon with long history in economics (Crawford and Varian, 1979) , having been applied in monetary economics (Rogoff, 1995; Chari et al., 2004) , industrial organization (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), tax competition (Brueckner, 2004) or environmental economics (Buchholz et al., 2005) . Incentives for strategic delegation emerge especially when delegates are expected to bargain. Conservative delegation is used to strategically decrease the breakdown allocation, and induce relatively larger compensations (Segendorff, 1998) . In contrast, progressive delegation gives advantage in the case of fixed cost-sharing rules (Besley and Coate, 2003) . Dur and Roelfsema (2005) point that the costsharing rule is the key: the larger non-shareable costs, the larger incentive to delegate conservatively and vice versa, both in decentralization and centralization. In our setup with the fixed cost-sharing rule, we will observe that other aspects (possibility of transfers or specification of marginal rate of substitution) play also a key role. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, and solves for the social optimum serving as the benchmark for normative analysis. Section 3 solves for equilibria in decentralization with and without transfers. It derives the sufficient condition for decentralization with transfers to deliver the social optimum. Section 4 examines cooperative centralization, and proves that cooperative centralization never attains the social optimum. Combined together, we derive the sufficient condition for cooperative centralization to be Pareto-inferior to non-cooperative decentralization. Section 5 motivates imperfect complementarity and discusses applications. Section 6 concludes.
Model

Assumptions
Our model closely follows the framework by Besley and Coate (2003) . The main difference is that a local public good and a 'spillover' from the other local public good are not substitutes, but complements. Motivation for this extension has been provided already by Besley and Coate, who anticipated that their main result may not be robust to different aggregation (Besley and Coate, 2003, fn. 15) . The extension is interesting since complementarity requires the setup to be substantially reinterpreted: instead of local public goods, we speak of local inputs, and instead of imperfect spillovers, we assume imperfect access to the other local input (more on interpretation follows in Section 5).
Assume two regions of equal size, 1, 2 i = . In each region, there is a continuum of voters j differing only in preferences for public goods, Production of inputs is financed through non-distortionary lump-sum taxes, i t . A unit of any 1 Besley and Coate (2003) impose that distributions must be symmetric and identical. This is unnecessarily restrictive since the purpose of these restrictions is only to get that a median (median-type) politician maximizes welfare of her region. In other words, the aim is to assume away any difference between median interests and (regional) social optimum, which is typically caused by skewed distribution of income (cf. Meltzer-Richard's classic model of redistribution). In our setup, to eliminate the difference, it is sufficient to impose that the mean type is identical to the median type, because social optimum can be written as optimum of a hypothetical individual with the mean of preference for public good. Whenever the median is equal to the mean, then this hypothetical individual in fact represents the median voter. 
Then, as calculated below in (2), the tax ( ) 
Any individual of type j λ from region i has a quasi-linear utility function with the complementary aggregation of local public goods,
where ( ) b G is an increasing and concave 2 C -function, and (0) 0 b = . Assume that all citizens are able to meet any tax obligation. The timing is as follows. In Stage 1, both regions independently and simultaneously delegate two purely policy-seeking citizen-candidates, one each. The delegates are the majority- 
Social optimum
In this section, we will determine the socially optimal amounts of the inputs. We apply the utilitarian measure of welfare, namely the sum of utilities of all individuals in both regions. To identify the social optimum, we use that
. This is because the sum of utilities in either of regions writes as 
In other words, the social optimum is an argument maximizing the following function,
We maximize (5) Table 1 . 
The last row in Table 1 indicates that (i) if i x is relatively low, the utilitarian criterion yields maximum feasible i x , and (ii) if i x is relatively high, it yields minimum feasible i x . The optimum therefore lies in the intermediate part (involving corners from previous types),
where the interior first order condition applies,
Imposing symmetry into (3), we derive the condition for the social optimum as a maximand of (5),
3. Decentralization Besley and Coate (2003) found that if regions provide local public goods with spillovers, and the goods are pure substitutes, decentralization without transfers leads to sincere delegation, but also to underprovision. Dur and Roelfsema (2005) distinguish between pure substitution, defined as ( ) ( )
No voluntary transfers
+ + , and strategic substitution, defined as ( )
where i c denotes private good (the difference is whether an increase in one public good affects marginal rate of substitution of the other public good with the private good). They highlight that if the local public goods are strategic substitutes, decentralization in addition leads to conservative delegation. Incentives for underprovision are thus even stronger.
In this section, we show that for our aggregation, these effects are extremely sensitive to the assumption of zero voluntary transfers. The complementary technology is extremely helpful to capture this point: without transfers, decentralization yields extreme underprovision; with transfers, it may even secure the social optimum. It is exactly complementary aggregation that reveals that the realistic possibility of voluntary transfers strikingly modifies results in noncooperative models of public good provision.
Proposition 1 In decentralization without transfers, for any two delegates
is a unique Nash equilibrium.
, a policy maker 1, 2 i ∈ can reduce i g (less costs) and at the same time ) is satisfied only as long as 1
The proposition is driven by the fact that for 1 κ < , the best responses of delegates intersect in zero, regardless of the delegates' preferences for the public good. As a result, voters have no incentive to behave strategically, and the possibility to vote strategically in Stage 1 brings no change to this extreme outcome.
Voluntary transfers
The opportunity to compensate another, less interested region has been highlighted by Vicary (1990) and for complementary aggregation studied by Sandler and Vicary (2001) , Vicary and Sandler (2002) , and experimentally by Lei et al. (2007) . We will see that the extension of a strategy set by voluntary transfers may restore the social optimum, and this efficient equilibrium will moreover be immune to the strategic delegation.
First of all, we will examine incentives in the subgame of delegates (Stage 2). In the very beginning, consider that the necessary condition for the best response (and henceforth for a Nash equilibrium) to exist is that each delegate minimizes costs for the fixed amount of the local output (no-waste property). We use this rather trivial property of the equilibrium in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In decentralization with transfers, in Nash equilibrium of the subgame of delegates, at least one of the regions contributes nothing to its own input, 1, 2 : 0
Proof We partition the set of strategy profiles in the following subsets: (a) 1 2 0 s s In subset (b), the delegate 1 contributes to both inputs, and cannot tolerate waste in either of them. The reason is that a strictly positive subsidy 1 0 s > implies a strictly positive 1 0 g > , and no-waste property gives
(otherwise no-waste property is violated). However, we know 1
In subset (c), an equilibrium is symmetric to the equilibrium in subset (b), 1 0 g = .
In subset (d), suppose first 1 0 g > and 2 0 g > . Then, no-waste properties for both delegates Lemma 1 suggests that in the equilibrium, at least one of the delegates reneges on providing domestic input, and rather cross-subsidizes the foreign input. The point is hidden is in the combination of complementarity and imperfect access to the foreign input: any delegate who contributes to own input in fact needs strictly more (at least 1 κ -times) inputs to be located in the other region. This obviously cannot hold for both regions at the same time.
To simplify search for equilibrium, we introduce two extra terms: for any delegate i , let Sstrategy be any strategy for which 0 
Specifically, let ( )
G λ be the optimal amount of the local output that the delegate i prefers to be provided if any additional output requires from her paying only extra foreign input, and
be the total amount of the foreign inputs corresponding to ( )
Let ( )
G λ be the optimal amount of the local output preferred by delegate i if any additional output requires from her paying both domestic and foreign input, and let ( )
T λ be the total amount of the foreign inputs corresponding to ( )
We use that for interior optimum in T-strategy, i
Notice that the marginal price per extra output is 1 κ + -times higher, hence ( ) ( )
Also, because of symmetry of the optimization problem, 1
What is particularly important is that the values of these interior optimal outputs are not affected by the strategy of the other delegate, ( , )
; later we will see that the other delegate only affects whether the optimum is available or not.
Finally, by comparing (7), (9) and (11) The mechanics of the proof has illustrated crucial properties of the equilibrium in the subgame of delegates. We found that the possibility of compensations makes median-type delegates install the social optimum, even in the purely non-cooperative mode. Nevertheless, we still do not know if the socially optimal allocation is immune to the possibility of strategic delegation. This is addressed by Proposition 3, whereby we deliver the core result of this section. 
Proposition 3
Condition (12) then imposes that if the median voter 1 nominates in this conservative way and free rides on the other region, her utility from invoking the best of ST-profiles is still less than the utility from the social optimum, involving the symmetric SS-profile. Since no other profile can give any better outcome, this condition is sufficiently strong to deter the median voter 1 from anything but sincere delegation. 
Example
The condition (12) 
Cooperative centralization
If decentralization can deliver the social optimum, why not cooperative centralization, where cost shares are equalized and delegates have access to perfect commitment/cooperation devices? With sincere delegation, joint bargaining of the two median-type politicians would indeed deliver the social optimum. Rational voters nevertheless tend to elect different delegates. This stems from dichotomy in devices available in each stage: in electoral stage, voters in one region play non-cooperatively with voters from the other region; in policymaking stage, the delegates play cooperatively among each other (bargain). Non-cooperative voters may welcome surplus from bargaining, but also try to improve their odds by effectively delegating a delegate with specific preferences. We find that the strategic delegation in centralization implies an unambiguous welfare loss in comparison with the social optimum. First, consider that the objective function of the two policy-makers who bargain over the provision of local inputs is
In analysing the optimum, we are firstly interested in the relative size of 1 x to 2 x . Therefore, suppose for the moment fixed total revenues (hence also fixed total spending), and derive the Table 2 , created analogically to Table 1 , where for all intervals 
Notice that the bargaining result is unique, since 1
U U + , subject to constant x , is strictly concave in 1 x on the middle interval,
Importantly, notice that if the solution is interior (of the third type), we can derive any i x in the following implicit form as a function ( )
After this introductory part, we can proceed to the main result. We again use that median voters are decisive in their regions. We will focus on their best responses in the noncooperative game in Stage 1 where the strategy is a type of the delegate. Finally we check that the delegates are Condorcet winners in regional elections.
Since we are only interested in stability of the socially optimal allocation, and this allocation can be achieved only via median-type delegates (obviously from (7) and (17)), this task reduces to discerning whether median-type delegates occur in equilibrium. Proposition 3 rejects this possibility; if a median voter expects a median-type delegate from the other region, she has an incentive to vote for a progressive delegate. 
We apply the implicit function theorem on (17) and derive that
Plugging (19) into (18), we recognize that for 1 d λ in order to be in interior optimum, we need that 2 x satisfies 1
By inspection of (15) Proof First, we prove that the social optimum in cooperative centralization needs mediantype delegates: social optimum is symmetric, * 1 2
x x x = = , so it must be the third type of solution in (15) . This type of solution must satisfy (17) . Comparing (17) and (7), and considering monotonicity of ( ) b ⋅ , this means that
Second, by Proposition 4, median-type delegates are not in equilibrium of cooperative centralization, hence cooperative centralization yields allocation that doesn't maximize welfare. Third, by Proposition 3, under condition (12) decentralization with transfers achieves the social optimum, hence welfare is greater than in cooperative centralization. 
Imperfect complementarity
In the introduction, we have considered a case where complementarity is due to strategic choice of an adversary. We can think of at least three other possibilities. Consumption complementarity. Extremely high (ideally infinitely large) marginal rate of substitution may be realistic for extreme scarcity of subsistence goods, e.g. sleep, water, or security. ( Piece-to-piece complementarity. Instead of local goods, we can think of inputs that are technologically predetermined to be pieces into a compound good. Imperfection may reflect that a norm prescribes access to certain amount of one of the inputs. Non-rivalry can be explained by time structure of the provision of inputs; the rival inputs are used in different, mutually exclusive time spans.
As an example of imperfect piece-to-piece complementarity, consider an organization with a technical unit and personal unit, T and P. The technical unit has t supercomputers, and personal unit has p experts. The management prescribes that each unit devotes ρ of working hours to the needs of the other unit (1 ρ − remains). To process certain tasks, the personal unit needs supercomputers, whereas the technical unit needs to sit the experts to the computers. One task is done if exactly one expert works for one working hour on a supercomputer (notice that we do not need that working time of each expert is identical or that working time of each computer is the same). Then, if we let (1 ) κ ρ ρ = − , the outputs write Norm-imposed complementarity. Even when inputs are effective substitutes, regulation can impose a fixed ratio, hence establishes artificial complementarity. Consider an example of a university consisting of two parts, a research center C and a teaching department D. The center hires r experienced researchers with the status of professors, and the department hires l lecturers. The research center pays researchers and department pays lecturers, but the university has a (more or less formal) rule that any employee must be available for the other part of the organization, at working capacity 1 κ < . To summarize: Imperfect complementarity can be traced in the production of governments, organizations and perhaps also in teams. Any interpretation of this very special aggregation has to address four issues: i. Complementarity. What makes production or consumption complementary? We recognized either strategic choice of an adversary (terrorists), an extreme marginal rate of substitution for subsistence (water and medicine), combination of physical and human capital (supercomputer and expert), or regulation (minimal number of professors and lecturers). ii. Imperfection. Why does an input/good from the other region enter imperfectly? We have suggested the importance of local knowledge (antiterrorist measures), spatial characteristics (spillovers), or regulation (organizational directives). iii. Immobility. What makes production locally specific? There can be spatial characteristic (borders, or rivers), or an exogenously predetermined allocation of competencies (organizational rules). iv. Non-rivalry and non-exclusion. Why is an input or good of one region or one organization unit available to the others, and for free? This was by mobility of an adversary (antiterrorist measures), uncontrolled spillovers (water), or regulation (organizational directives).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined decentralization and centralization of the provision of imperfect complements, in the case of two fully symmetric regions. We have extended Besley and Coate (2003) in two respects: (i) complements, not substitutes were investigated; (ii) voluntary transfers from one region to another were permitted. Like the previous literature (cf. Dur and Roelfsema, 2005) , we find that cooperative centralization with uniform taxation induces progressive delegation; voters tend to delegate politicians who are very much in favor of public-good provision. We stress two novel findings: the possibility of transfers allows non-cooperative decentralization to reach even the first-best allocation (social optimum), immune to strategic delegation, whereas cooperative centralization always implies deviation from the first best. Hence, cooperative centralization of imperfect complements is never the first best, and may not even be the second best. Also, the tradeoffs associated with centralization need not to exist at all. Albeit the scope of complementary aggregation is limited, it is useful to find out this straightforward result in a strategically rich and realistic setting where both voluntary transfers and strategic delegation are taken into account.
